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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
General Background of the Prohlpm
The processes by which individuals change their attitudes
have been the subject of a variety of speculation and investi-
gation (cf. Fishbein, 1957; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953;
Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969). Most of the research in
this area examines attitude change as a consequence of direct
experience with the attitude object. This study, on the other
hand, focuses on attitude change which occurs through the
observation of someoiie else's behavior. It is important and
interesting, for example, to analyze how people, adults and
children alike, come to possess enduring prejudices which often
are not based upon personal experience. How is it, for example,
that some individuals come to dislike vehemently members of a
minority group with which they have never come into contact?
An individual may change his attitude or his behavior as
a function of experience. There are a number of different con-
ceptualizations which may explain the phenomenon of attitude
change. One line of explanation is that the individual has
learned the attitude. Learning theory has been applied to
attitude development by various investigators (Doob, 1947;
Fishbein, 1967; Kerpelman & Himmelfarb, 1971; Rhine, 1958;
Staats & Staats, 1958). There are, however, other approaches
which can account adequately for the occurrence of attitude
change. A more cognitively oriented approach, for instance,
may view attitude change as a reorganization of cognitions in
order to achieve a balanced state. Balance theory (Heider,
19S8) would interpret the attitude resulting from attitude
change as a cognitive restructuring motivated by some unpleasant
situational variable.
Another approach which may be able to explain attitude
change, and one that has been relatively neglected as an
attitude change conceptualization, is attitude change as a
result of observing others, that is, modeling and social
learning (Bandura & Walters, 1963). Social learning concerns
itself principally with behavior which is learned by a person's
observation of an example. Most social learning theorists
maintain that "human behavior is to a large extent socially
transmitted, either deliberately or inadvertently, through
exposure to social models" (Bandura, 1970, p. 1 ) . Social
•learning theorists further maintain that behavior may be learned
in the absence of external reinforcement; that is, reinforcement
is not a necessary condition, although it is a facilitating one,
in social learning.
There is some question as to whether or not it is legit imat
to assert that the phenomenon of social learning conforms
strictly to traditional learning theory. There may be changes
occurring in a particular situation which may look like learning
but are, in fact, non-learning changes. Bandura (1955g) per-
formed a study which investigated learning-like changes.
Children watched a model, who either received positive, negative
or no reinforcement, perform a series of behaviors. In a test
condition, the children who had seen the model negatively rein-
forced did not reproduce the model's behavior, whereas the
other two groups of children did. Later, however, when all
children were rewarded for emission of the model's behavior,
they were all able to reproduce it. Bandura concluded that
the change in behavior which occurred in the test condition
was not a learning change, but was a performance effect.
Learn incT, Performance ^ or Cognitive Change :
A Theoretical Issue
Since determining whether learning has occurred or not may
be difficult, a general definition of learning will be
specified. Learning, according to Kimble (1961), is "a
relatively permanent change in response potentiality which
occurs as a result of reinforced practice" (p. 481). From this
definition, two criteria are specified for learning: reinforce-
ment and practice. Reinforcement refers to the process by which
the probability that a response will recur is increased.
Learning theorists, however, do not agree among themselves
upon the criteria for learning. Tolman and Honzik (1930) , for
example, most likely would not cite reinforcement while Estes
(1954) would not cite practice as necessary conditions for
learning.
Although these two criteria seem like simple criteria to
assess, it is very often difficult to determine whether or not
they have been met in a situation. In some observational
learning situations, for example, an observer, although showing
no overt practice of the model's response, may actually be
covertly practicing that response. Moreover, in associational
learning situations, no apparent reinforcement is available,
but learning theorists would still argue that learning is
taking place. Social learning theorists themselves consider
most changes which occur in modeling situations to be
learning (e.g., Aronfreed, 1968; Bandara, 1965b). Thus, even
though there jray sometimes be no tangible rei. nforcemsnt in
the situation and frequently no overt practice trials may
precede the performance of the response, a change in attitude
as a result of social learning will be considered as learning
primarily because that is the language of social learning
theorists. It may be that when theorists use the term learning,
they actually may be categorizing some response to cues which
merely makes a subject perform differently. But, because
social learning theorists tend to label the change as learning,
that is the label which will be used here.
When viewed in terms of balance theory, the learning aspects
of attitude change are not considered. The main reason for this
is that cognitive theorists do not emphasize learning in their
theorizing. Their concern is with a cognitive change, not with
learning. For example, they are concerned with situations in
which a person may change his attitude toward an object based
solely on his perception of a liked other ^s attitude toward that
object. It is also true that there is no apparent reinforcement
nor practice present in the situation to be studied, so that
the change in attitude does not meet the criteria of learning.
5Learning is not really a part of the language of the cognitive
theorists being considered here. They conceive of attitude
change as a change which is motivated by an unpleasant cognitive
structure and which occurs through a reorganization of
cognitions. Thus, cognitive theorists view the process as
one in which an individual encounters a single situation which
may be cognitively unpleasant, and he makes some decision in
order to restore balance to his cognitive system.
The Experimental Situation
The present experiment uses a situation which is analogous
to many natural social learning situations. Any attitude
change which occurs in the situation will be thought of as
learning in the framework of social learning and as a re-
organization of cognitions in the framework of cognitive change
theories. The specific situation is one in which an observer
(0) perceives a model (M) behave toward another person (X).
M's relationship to 0 varies such that M is either positively
related to 0 (a best friend) or negatively related to 0 (a
worst enemy). The relationship between 0 and M is an important
one because some of the most influential people in one's life
are those for whom one feels great affect. Secord and Backman
(1964) state, "The principal agents in socialization are other
persons, most notably the child's parents, teachers, siblings,
playmates, and others v\?ho are significant to him" (p. 525).
Theoretical AnnlY -c^-fg
In the present experiment, two theoretical approaches will
be dealt with which conceive of the t.'iadic situation dif-
ferently and consequently offer different theoretical inter-
pretations of the situations and different predictions of the
resulting attitudes. The approaches investigated are modeling
theory and balance theory.
Modeling Theory
The first theoretical approach which is able to make
predictions concerning the attitude developed by 0 is modeling
theory (Bandura, 1965b, 1970; Bandura- & Walters, 1953). Bandura
(1970) claims "that modeling influences operate principally
through their informative function, and that observers acquire
mainly symbolic representations of modeled events rather than
specific stimulus-response associations" (p. 18). There are
four interrelated subprocesses which are postulated to govern
modeling phenomena (Bandura, 1970). These are attentional
processes, retention processes, motoric reproduction processes,
and reinforcement and motivational processes. Attentional
processes are requisite to the acquisition of matching behavior.
If an observer does not attend to the distinctive features of
the model's behavior, it is fruitless to expect any modeling
of these behaviors. There are many variables which can influence
the attentional process in social learning. One of these, which
is germane to the present study, is the distinctiveness and the
interpersonal attractiveness of the models. The retentional
processes are the second subprocesses which govern modeling.
The retentional processes are activated when an observer
observes a model's behavior without performing it; then, at
some later time vv;hen the model is no longer present, the
observer performs the behavior. In order for this behavior to
have been produced in the absence of the model, it must have
been retained in some symbolic form by the observer. The third
components of modeling are the motoric reproduction processes.
In order for behavior to be produced in the absence of the
model, some symbolic representation of the motoric components
of the behavior must have been employed. For any behavior, the
components of that behavior must be in the repertoire of the
observer. New behaviors may be learned by combining the
existing components in new and more elaborate ways, but the
basic components must be available in the observer. The final
.subprocesses of modeling are the reinforcement and motivational
processes. While the learning of modeled behaviors can occur
without reinforcement, reinforcement and motivational processes
do influence when the behavior will, and when it will not, be
performed overtly. Reinforcement, moreover, may determine to
which events the observers are more likely to attend.
It is assumed in tvv'o situations of the present experimental
design, that because M is posited to be the best friend of 0,
this will serve to direct O's attention to M's behavior. Thus,
if 0 is motivated to attend to M's behavior, it may be argued,
based upon Bandura's theorizing, that 0 will form some symbolic
representation of the motoric components of M's behavior. At
8some Later time, with appropriate reinforcement, 0 will be able
to perform the behavior, at least in part. It is assumed in
the present study, moreover, that not only will 0 learn M's
behavior, but he will concurrently learn an attitude toward
X which is a reflection of the behavior M performed toward X.
It may be speculated that in the symbolic representation utiliz
by 0 to retain M's behavior, there may be components which
classify the behavior as positive or negative and which infer
the attitude of M toward X.
The extension of social learning theory suggests, then,
that 0 must attend to M and that 0 will match his behavior and
attitude to the behavior and the inferred attitude of M. The
implication of this prediction for the present experiment is
that in the situation in which 0 and M are positively related
(i.e., best friends), and M's behavior has a positive consequen
•for X, 0 will form a symbolic representation of M's positive
response, infer a positive attitude of M toward X, and will
subsequently change his attitude toward X from neutral to
positive. In a similar manner, when 0 and M are positively
related, and M's behavior has a negative consequence for X, 0
will form a symbolic representation of M's negative response,
infer M's negative attitude tov\7ard X, and will subsequently
change his attitude toward X from neutral to negative.
When the situations are such that 0 and M are negatively
related (i.e., worst enemies), it may be that M is a negative
model for 0. The. negative modeling paradigm has not received
a great deal of empirical investigation; it seems to have
application, however, to the present experimental situation. A
negative model is essentially the opposite of a positive model-
it is someone not to follow. Parents often use negative models
as examples to their children of persons who behave undesirably
or who have undesirable attitudes or characteristics. The
parents point to these persons as ones that their children should
not emulate (Bandura & Walters, 1963). The negative modeling
process involves attention focused on the negative models and
a training period whereby an individual learns to discriminate
who are negative models and learns not to copy their behavior.
Thus, after learning has occurred and when a negative model is
recognized, his behavior may be ignored or the opposite behavior
may be expressed.
In the present experimental situation, the relationship
between 0 and M may be a determining factor of the attitude 0
forms toward X. If M is a negative model for 0, 0 may attend
less to M's behavior or he may produce a behavior opposite to
the one he does perceive. Because of the procedure of the
present experiment, it will be difficult for 0 to ignore the
behavior of M since it is right in front of him; it is thought,
then, that 0 will respond by producing the opposite behavior of
M, rather than ignoring it. Thus, if M's behavior has a positiv
consequence for X, it is hypothesized that 0 will experience
the opposite feeling, negativity toward X--a negative modeling
effect. Similarly, if a negative M behaves with a negative
consequence for X, 0 is hypothesized to change his attitude
to a positive one toward X.
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B_alance Theory
Heider's (1958) balance theory provides the second inter-
pretation of the situations used here, and offers predictions
for the type of attitude change an observer will display toward
another person. Balance theory deals with cognitive states of
balance and imbalance within two and three entity systems. In
a two entity system, a person either likes or dislikes another. •
These systems are balanced if the person perceives that the
effectual relationship is reciprocated by the other person and
imbalanced if the person perceives that the affectual relation-
ship is not reciprocated by the other person. In a three entity
system, the person and the other are related to a third person
or thing. The person and the- other may like or dislike the
third person or thing. A balanced system obtains when the
product of the three valence signs of relationship is positive
and imbalanced when the product is negative, for example,
-,-,+ is balanced, whereas
-,+,+ is imbalanced.
In the experimental design of the present study, an analogous
system exists in which the person is the observer (0) who sees
another (M) behave in some way toward a third person (X) . It
is hypothesized in balance theory that a person will be
motivated to alter his system until a. balanced system obtains.
In the present experiment, it is assumed that O's resultant
attitude toward X is some change from neutrality. In the
situations in which 0 and M are positively related and M's
behavior has a positive consequence f or X, it is predicted, based
on balance theory, that for a balanced system to obtain, 0 will
11
change his neutral attitude toward X to positive. If 0 and M
have a positive relationship and M's behavior has a negative
consequence for X, a balanced system results if 0 develops a
negative attitude toward X. If, on the other hand, 0 and M
are negatively related and M's behavior has a positive con-
sequence for X, it is predicted, based on balance theory, that
0 will change his attitude toward X to a negative one. Finally,
if 0 and M are negatively related and M's behavior has a
negative consequence for X, the theoretical prediction is that
0 should develop a positive attitude toward X in order for a
balanced, system to result.
It is further hypothesized that because no relationship is
static, the observer may also change his attitude toward M to
achieve balance. Friends who perform negative acts may be seen
as being less positive, while enemies who perform positive acts
may be seen as less negative. This is one point of distinction
from social learning approaches. Balance and cognitive theories
go beyond the focus of the 0 - X relationship as a function of
the model and his behavior; they further allow for an attitude
change toward M. Social learning approaches, thus, emphasize
the model's behavior, whereas the cognitive theories place
em[X)hasis on the entire triadic relationship. Balanced structures
are still achieved then, but through a more complicated process.
Comparison of Theoretical Predictions
The present study investigates the triadic relationship of
an observer, positively or negatively related to a model, who
12
observes the model's behavior which has a positive or a negative
consequence for another person.' Two theoretical conceptualizations
have been presented which provide different frameworks for the
interpretation of the situations and for subsequent predictions
of the effectual relationship of the observer for the other
person. Table 1 offers a summary of the predictions for each
of the situations based upon each theory. A plus in a cell of
Table 1 indicates a prediction that 0 will change his attitude
toward X from neutral to a positive attitude; a minus indicates
a prediction that 0 will change his attitude toward X from neutral
to a negative attitude. It can be seen that a prediction based
upon modeling theory is that when M is a positive model, O's
attitude toward X will be the same as the consequence of M's
behavior was for X. When M is a negative model, it is predicted
that O's attitude toward X will be opposite of the consequence
of M*s behavior tov;ard X. It can also be seen that the pre-
dictions for O's attitude toward X for each situation are the
same for balance theory as they are for modeling theory. The
predictions, however, were made based on different theoretical
arguments. It is hoped that the occurrence of any change in O's
attitude toward M and the justification the subjects are asked
to give for their attitudes will specify which of these two
theories is more applicable. Neither theory is argued to account
for the results better than the other; it is the major purpose
of the present investigation to discover which theory offers
the most appropriate conceptual framework for the results.
Table 1
Summary of the Attitude Change Predictions Made by
Each of the Theories for the Four Situations
Theories Situations
FR-t> ER+c ER-d
Modeling
Positive +
Negative
_ +
Balance + _ . _ +
A friend's behavior has a
I-
^A friend's behavior has a
*^An enemy's behavior has a
^An enemy's behavior has a
positive consequence for X.
negative consequence for X.
positive consequence for X.
negative consequence for X.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 148 undergraduates at the University of
Massachusetts who volunteered for the experiment in order to
receive extra course credit. One hundred and fifty-two students
participated in the study, but four were eliminated because
they did not read the stories correctly, thus leaving 148
subjects.
Materials
The materials for the experiment were typewritten stories
which represented the various situations to be investigated.
Rating scales were used to assess the observer's attitude
to\^/ard X, toward M, toward the consequence of M's behavior for
X, and toward the perceived attitude of M about X. Before the
subjects read the stories, a pretest was administered which
assessed the observer's attitude toward each of the characters
in the stories. In this way, pre-post attitude change scores
could be obtained. It was necessary to use a pretest because
it could not be assumed that the subjects' initial attitude
toward the characters was neutral.
Three stories were used which v\/nre constructed so that each
met the same criteria. Each story contained a model who v^;as
either the best friend (positive relationship) or the worst
enemy (negative relationship) of the observer (subject) . The
model had a choice in the behavior he could perform toward X;
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he then performed a response which resulted in either a positive
or negative consequence for X. For example, one of the stories
involved a high school teacher who is either the subject's
best friend or worst enemy. The teacher has a student in the
class. Bob, who is performing marginally. The teacher has the
option of passing Bob or of failing Bob and making him repeat
the course. The justification for the model's behavior was not -
obvious. Each story, then, had four versions: 1) a positive M's
behavior had a positive consequence for X (FR+)
, 2) a positive
M's behavior had a negative consequence for X (FR-)
, 3) a negative
M's behavior had a positive consequence for X (ER+)
, 4) a negative
M s behavior had a negative consequence for X (ER- )
.
The three stories were thus alike in structure, but they
represented different contexts in which to study attitude change.
One story, the clerk story, represented a context in which a
customer is either waited on or is made to wait by a store
clerk. A second story, the teacher story, portrayed a context
in which a teacher either passes or fails a marginal student.
In a third story, the ticket story, a college student offers a
concert ticket he is not going to use for sale at $2.00 or $4.00
to another student who only has $2.00. The three stories
represented varied everyday situations in which to study attitude
change. To be assured that each of the three stories was con-
sistent with one another, not only were they constructed to
conform to the criteria discussed abov'e, but also they were
given to pilot subjects to be rated. From the ratings and
comments of the pilot subjects, some stories were eliminated
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because they introduced extraneous variables, and the three
stories to be used were chosen as the ones being most comparable.
It was thus with some empirical support that the three stories,
which represented different contexts for attitude change, were
thought to be alike in structure and to be consistent with one
another. The four versions of the clerk story are reproduced
in Appendix A, the four versions of the teacher story appear in
Appendix B, and the four versions of the ticket story are
reproduced in Appendix C.
Each subject read one version of each story. This produced
four groups of 37 subjects. Each subject of one group read one
version of one story, a different version of the second story,
and still a different version of the third story. After reading
each story, the subjects filled out a nine-point bipolar ad-
jective pair (very positive/very negative) assessing their
attitude toward X, toward M, tov^;ard the consequence of M's act
for X, and toward the perceived attitude of M toward X. A
sample of the attitude questionnaire 35 presented in Appendix D.
The subjects were also asked to justify their answers.
To assess the subjects' attitudes toward M and X before
they read the stories, a pretest session was conducted one week
before the main session. Each subject participated in both a
pretest session and a posttest session. They received a question-
naire which consisted of various characters and a short descrip-
tion of each, for example, "A lady in a green coat who is
shopping." The model and the other person from each story were
included in the questionnaire along with 16 buffer items. Each
item was followed by a nine-point bipolar adjective pair (very
positive/very negative) upon which the subject made his rating.
The pretest is reproduced in full in Appendix E.
Procedure
The subjects were run in large groups in both the pretest
session and the posttest session. The groups ranged in size
from approximately 20-50 subjects. A subject participating in
a pretest session then was scheduled for a posttest session
which was run at least one week later. In all but a few cases,
just one week elapsed between the first and the second sessions.
In a few cases, slightly longer than one week, 9-11 days, elapsed
between the first and second session.
In the pretest session, all subjects received the pretest
questionnaire. Each subject filled in the identification blanks
.on the front, and read over the instructions. The experimenter
then went over the instructions with the subjects to eliminate
any misunderstandings. The instructions were as follows:
On the following pages are statements describing
various types of people. They are to be rated on
the scales provided. The scales measure the degree
of positive or negative feeling you have for each of
the people. If you feel very positive toward the
person, place an X in the space above the words "very
positive"; if you feel very negative toward the per-
son, place an X in the space above the words "very
negative"; if you feel neuli'al toward the person,
place an X in the space above the word "neutral." Use
any of the spaces in between for lesser degrees of
positive or negative feeling.
Many of the descriptions will describe people whom you
do not know. In these cases, try to imagine how you
would feel tov\;ard a person fitting the descriptions.
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An example was also included to illustrate the scoring of the
bipolar adjective pair and to emphasize that since not all of
the descriptions would fit people the subject knew, he should
imagine how he would feel. It was also emphasized that no scale
should be left blank. The subjects then filled out the question-
naire at their own speed. When all of the subjects were finished,
the experimenter collected the questionnaires. The experimenter
told the subjects that nothing could be revealed about the study
at this point; arrangements were then made for the second session.
In the posttest session, the subjects were given booklets
containing one situation of the clerk story, a different situa-
tion of the teacher story, and still a different situation of
the ticket story. The order of the stories in each booklet was
determined randomly. Attitude scales and justification questions
followed each story. There were, then, four different possible
booklets, and each subject randomly received one of the booklets.
As in the first session, the subjects filled in the idenrifica-
tion blanks on the front and read over the instructions. The
experimenter then went over the instructions with the subjects
and emphasized the important parts. The instructions were as
follows:
On the following pages are some short stories. Each
story involves either your best friend or your worst
enemy. As you read each of the stories, keep in mind
that it is your best friend or v\;orst enemy who is
involved. After each story there are two pages of
questions. Please complete all the scales and questions
for one story before reading the next story. The
instructions for the rating scales are the same as in
Session 1; the questions are to be answered as best
you can, but concisely.
19
Be sure the you read the stories very carefullybe sure the you understand what has happened in the
story. Do not assume anything -- read each story
very carefully. ^
Please ansvN;er every scale and question; do not leaye
any blank.
The subjects were instructed to think of their yery best friend
and their yery worst enemy and to write that person's initials
in the appropriate spaces at the beginning of each story. The
subjects then read the stories and answered the questions at
their own rate. When all subjects were finished, their booklets
were collected by the experimenter. The purpose of the experiment
was then completely explained to the subjects. The subjects
were asked for their cooperation in remaining silent, and they
were giyen experiment credit slips.
20CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The semantic differential scales used to assess the attitude
developed toward the model (M)
, tov.ard the other person (X)
,
toward the consequence of the model's behavior, and toward the
model's attitude toward the other person were scored on a nine-
point scale, with a score of one assigned to the negative
position, five to neutral, and nine to the positive position on
the scale.
The results of the three stories are presented below
separately, with the clerk story first, followed by the teacher
story, and finally the ticket story.. The stories are presented
separately for two reasons: first, the pre-ratings of the
characters of the stories shovr/ed that the characters of one of
the stories (the ticket story) were rated significantly more
positively than the characters of the other stories; second,
the subjects were run in an incomplete Latin Square so that
every subject group did not occur at each treatment; only three
of the four groups went through each treatment.
Within each story, the first results to be reported are the
posttest manipulation checks on the independent variables.
Next, the posttest data are presented on the dependent variables.
Third, the pretest-posttest change scores for the dependent
variables are reported; and finally, a summary of the story
findings is offered. The data from the justification questions
are not reported here because they were so difficult to interpret.
21
-Story li_The_Cle_rk Story
The first story to be reported is the clerk story (refer
to Appendix A)
.
Table 2 presents the mean scores from the
posttest bipolar adjective pair (very positive/very negative)
for M, for X, for the consequence of M^s behavior, and for the
perceived attitude of M toward X in the four triadic situations.
Posttest Analysis
Manipulation Checks of the Independent Var-Tnhl p.c; ,
A one-way analysis of variance was performed on the ratings
of the consequence of M's behavior for X, and a significant dif-
ference was found among the four situations (F - 58.43, df = 3/144,
£ < .01). It can be seen from Table 2 that the consequence of
M's behavior in the two negative response conditions (R-) was
judged to be negative, while the consequence of M's behavior in
the two positive response conditions (R+) was rated as positive.
Duncan^s Multiple Range test, performed on the individual means,
showed that the larger of the two negative consequence means
(3.11) was rated significantly (^ < .01) less positive than the
tv^;o positive consequence means (6.03). The other comparison
between the positive and negative consequence means (5.03 vs.
2.68) which represents a larger difference was, of course, also
found to be significant (£ < .01). It is^as also found that there
v;ere no differences in the rating of the friend's positive act
and the enemy ^s positive act, nor between the friend's negative
act and the enemy's negative act.
A second check on the experimental manipulations concerned
Table 2
Mean Posttest Ratings for the Model, the Lady,
the Consequence of M's Behavior, and the Perceived
Attitude of M toward X in the Clerk Story
for the Four Triadic Situations
Situation
FR- ER+ ER-
Consequcnce of M's
Behavior for X, 6.03^ 3.11 6.03 2.68the Lady
Attitude toward M 7.95 6. 49 3.70 2.19
Attitude tovv;ard X 5.19 6.00 5.32 6.54
Perceived Attitude
of M toward X ^-^9 4.65 5.27 3.76
^Mean rating on a 9 point scale:
1 is negative.
9 is positive, 5 is neutra
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the rating of the model. A one-way analysis of variance was
performed on the ratings of M, and a significant difference
among the four situations was found (F = 65.68, df = 3/lW,
£ < .01). It is seen in Table 2 that the subjects rated their
enemies negatively, and they rated their friends positively
(2.19 and 3.70 vs. 6.49 and 7.95). Applying Duncan's Multiple
Range test, the_
_mQre positive ratine of thP Pnpmy (3.70) was
found to differ significantly (£ < .01) from the less positive
ratin^_of the friend (6.49). It follows, then, that the means
for enemy and friend conditions which were farther apart were
also significant (6.49 vs. 2.19; 7.95 vs. 3.70; 7.95 vs. 2.19).
In summary, in the clerk story, the enemy model and M's
negative response were seen as negative, while the friend model
and M's positive response were seen as positive.
Attitude Change: The Dependent Variabl es
.
Att itude change toward X , the lady, on the posttest. It
may be seen from Table 2 that the atti.tude formed toward the
lady varied with the situation. Subjects rated the lady most
favorably (6.54) in the ER- situation, second most favorably in
the FR- situation (6.00), next most favorably in the ER+ situ-
ation (5.32), and least favorably in the FR+ situation (5.19).
All of the posttest ratings of the lady, however, v;ere more
positive than neutral. A one-way analysis of variance performed
on the rating scores of the lady revealed a significant dif-
ference among them across the four situations (F = 12.89,
df = 3/144, £ < .01). The lady was rated more positively when
the consequence of M's act was negative (5.54 and 6.00) than
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when the consequence was positive for her (5.32 and 5.19). She
was also rated more positively when the consequence of an enemy's
behavior was negative (6.54) than when the consequence of a .
friend's behavior was negative (6.00). Duncan's Multiple Range
test revealed that all comparisons were significant at least
at the .05 level, except for the comparison of FR+ versus ER+,
which was not significant.
In summary, then, it was found that the posttest attitude
ratings toward the lady were most positive in the ER- situation
(6.54). This rating vs/as significantly more positive than the
rating in the FR- situation (5.00), and both, in turn, were
significantly more positive than the mean ratings of the lady
in the ER-}- (5.32) and in the FR+ (5.19) situations. The ratings
of the lady in the last two situations were essentially the same.
Thus, the lady was rated most positively when the consequence of
M's, especially the enemy's, behavior v;as negative for her.
Attitude chanQ;e toward M, the clerk, on the posttest . As
v\7as stated above, subjects appropriately perceived enemies as
negative and friends as positive. There were, in addition, dif-
ferences within the two enemy conditions and within the two
friend conditions. A one-way analysis of variance performed on
the posttest ratings of the model showed a significant difference
across the four conditions (F = 56.68, df = 3/144, £ < .01). It
can be seen in Table 2 that although an enemy was always rated
below neutral, the rating of the enemy in the ER+ situation
(3.70) was more positive than the rating of the enemy in the
ER- situation (2.19); and this difference was significant
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(E < .01) as shov^n by Duncan's Multiple Range test. Similarly,
it was found that a friend who behaved negatively was downrated
(6.49) compared with a friend who behaved positively (7.95)
(£ < .01 on Duncan's Multiple Range test). The model ratings,
in sum, showed that an enemy who acted positively was uprated
comr^ared with an enemy who acted negatively, while a friend who
acted negatively was downrated compared with a friend who acted
positively.
Posttest ratinrr of M's attitude toward X, the lady. The
means reported in Table 2 show that a more positive attitude
toward the lady was attributed to a friend than was attributed
to an enemy when each performed the same type of response (5.50
vs. 5.27 and 4.65 vs. 3.76). The ascribed attitude of M toward
X was found to differ significantly among the four situations by
a onG-v^?ay analysis of variance (F = 16.03, df = 3/144, £ < .01).
.A Duncan's Multiple Range test v^;as performed among the means.
The friend in the FR- situation was rated as having a more
positive attitude toward the lady (4.65) than was the enemy in
the ER- situation (3.76); this difference was significant
(n < .01). The friend in the FR+ situation, moreover, was rated
as having a slightly more positive attitude (5.59) than the enemy
in the ER+ situation (5.27), but these two means were not sig-
nificantly different. A more positive attitude (5.27) was
attributed to an enemy who acted positively than to a friend
who acted negatively (4.65); the difference was significant
(p < .05). As would be expected, a significantly (£ < .01) more
positive attitude (5.59) was attributed to a friend who behaved
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positively than was attributed both to a friend who behaved
negatively ((|.65) and to an enemy who acted negatively (3.76).
Further, an enemy who acted positively was rated as having a
more positive attitude (S.27) than an enemy who acted negatively
(3. 70); this difference was significant (£ < .01).
In sum, a model wlio acted negatively was seen as having a
less positive attitude toward the lady than a model who acted
positively. In addition, a friend was seen as having a more
positive attitude than an enemy when each performed the same
response; this finding was only significant with respect to a
negative consequence situation.
Change scores were obtained for each subject by taking the
difference between the posttest scores and the pretest scores
on the items corresponding to the particular story. Table 3
presents the mean change scores from the pretest to the posttest
for the lady and the clerk in the four triadic situations of
the clerk story. The mean of all the pretest ratings for the
lady was 5.26, just slightly above neutral, the rating for the
clerk friend by those subjects who received the friend story was
7.96, and the rating for the clerk enemy by those subjects who
received the enemy story was 2.05.
Posttcst-Pretest Chnn.fjes toward the Lady .
A one-way analysis of variance performud on the change scores
between the pretest and the posttest in attitude toward the lady
revealed a significant difference (F = 5.33, df = 3/mU, £ < .01).
It was found, as is seen in Table 3, thai: in the F'R- and in the
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Table 3
Mean Change Scores from the Pretest to Posttest
for the Model and the Lady in the Clerk Story
for the Four Triadic Situations
Situation
FR+ FR- ER+ ER-
Change Score toward _
X, the Lady^ -81 -.03 1.14
Change Score toward
M, the Clerk^ --05 -1-43 1.68 .16
A positive change score indicates a more positive attitude
in the posttest; a negative score indicates a more positive
attitude in the pretest.
Mean of pretest ratings =5.25.
Mean of pretest rating for clerk friend = 7^96.
Mean of pretest rating for clerk enemy = 2.05«,
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FR- situations, the subjects' attitude toward the lady became
more positive from the pretest attitude (1.14 and .81 respec
tively). These two conditions did not differ significantly
from each other in the amount of positive attitude change, but
they did show significantly (£ < .05) more positive attitude
change when compared with any of the other conditions as
revealed by a Duncan's Multiple Range test. Relatively little
attitude change from the pretest to the posttest was found in
the ER+ situation (-.03) or in the FR-^ situation (.11), and
these two situations were not found to differ significantly
from" one another.
In summary, these change scores add support to the finding
that if the consequence of a model's behavior was negative for
another, an observer rated that other more positively than if
the consequence of a model's behavior \ms positive for that
person.
Posttest-Pretest Changes toward the Model.
A one-way analysis of variance performed on the change
scores between the pretest and the posttest in subjects' attitude
toward the model revealed a significant difference (F = 14.14,
df 3/144, £ < .01). Duncan's Multiple Range test revealed
that the increase in positive attitude toward the enemy in the
ER-i- situation (1.58) was significantly (£ < .01) more positive
than the change score of the enemy in the ER- situation (.16).
The change in attitude from the pretest to the posttest, more-
over, was significantly (£ < .01) less positive for a friend
who behaved negatively (-1.43) than for a friend who behaved
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positively (-,05). There was also a greater decrease (2. < .01)
in positive attitude toward a friend v.ho behaved negatively
(--L43) than toward an enemy who behaved negatively (.16). As
can be seen in Table 3, the change in attitude toward an enemy
who behaved positively was positive (1.68) v.hile the change in
attitude toward a friend who behaved negatively was negative
(-1.43); the difference between these two means was significant
(r < .01). I'Jhen both a friend and an enemy performed a positive
act (FR+ and ER+)
,
the attitude change toward the enemy (1.58)
was significantly (£ < .01) more positive than the attitude
change toward the fr lend (-. 05) . Finally, there was no difference
in attitude change between a friend whose behavior had a positive
consequence (-.05) and an enemy whose behavior had a negative
consequence (.16), perhaps because each behavior was seen as
appropriate for the respective model.
It is seen in summary, then, that a friend who acted
negatively v^7as dovvnrated (i.e., was rated less positively) while
an enemy v;ho acted positively was rated more favorably (i.e.,
was rated less negatively)
.
Summary
In general, in the clerk story, 'it was found that subjects
rated the lady most positively when the consequence of M's
behavior was negative for her; this was especially true if M
was an enemy. In all situations, however, the lady vv-as alv;ays
rated above neutral. The subjects also rated the models in
accordance with the kind of behavior they performed. Thus, an
enemy who behaved positively v/as rated more positively than an
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enemy who behaved negatively. A friend who aeted negatively was
rated less positively than a friend who acted positively.
Finally, it was found that a model who behaved negatively was
rated as having a less positive attitude toward the lady than
a model who acted positively. Also, a more positive attitude
was attributed to a friend than to an enemy when the behavior
of each had a negative consequence for the lady.
Story_
_2:_The Teacher Story
The second story to be reported is the teacher story (refer
to Appendix B)
.
Table u presents the mean scores from the
posttest bipolar adjective pair (very positive/very negative)
for M, for X, for the consequence of M's behavior, and for the
perceived attitude of M toward X in the four triadic situations.
Posttest Analysis
Manipulation Checks of the Independent Variables .
A one-way analysis of variance was performed on the ratings
of the consequence of M's behavior for X, and a significant
difference was found to exist among the ratings in the four
situations (F = 88.71, df = 3/144, ^ < .oi). It can be seen
from Table 4 that the consequence of M's behavior in the two
negative conditions (R-) was judged to be negative (1.97 and
2.89), while the consequence of M's behavior in the two positive
response conditions (R+) was judged to be positive (6.76 and
7.16). Duncan's Multiple Range test, performed on the individual
means, showed that the larger of the two negative consequence
means (2.89) v^as rated significantly (£ < .01) less positive
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Table ^
Mean Posttest Rating for the Model, Bob, the
Consequence of M's Behavior, and the Perceived
Attitude of M toward X in the Teacher Story
for the Four Triadic Situations
Situation
Consequence of M's
Behavior for X
Attitude toward M
Attitude tovN/ard X, Bob
Perceived Attitude
of M tovszard X
FR+ FR- ER+ ER-
6.76^ 2.89 7.16 1.97
8.24 7.00 3.65 2.27
6.14 5.49 5.76 6.49
7.11 4.84 6.16 3.30
Mean rating on a 9-point scale:
1 is negative.
9 is positive, 5 is neutral.
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than the smaller of^ _th^two positive con^enurnr^^^ (6.76).
The other comparisons between the positive and negative con-
sequence means (6.76 vs. 1.97; 7.15 vs. 2.89; 7.15 vs. 1.97)
which represent a larger difference were, of course, also found
to be significant (j^ < .01).
A second check on the experimental manipulations was on
the rating of the model. A one-way analysis of variance was
performed on the ratings of M, and a significant difference was
found to exist among the four situations (F = 85.28, df = 3/1MI+,
E. < .01). The subjects rated their enemies negatively, and they
rated their friends positively (2.27 and 3.65 vs. 7.00 and 8.2U)
Applying Duncan's Multiple Range test, the most positive rating
of the enemy (3.65) was found' to differ significantly (£ < .01)
from the least positive rating of the friend (7.00). It follows
then, that the means for enemy and friend conditions which were
farther apart were also significant (7.00 vs. 2.27; 8.2^ vs. 3.S
8.2^ vs. 2.27) .
In summary in the teacher story, the enemy model and M's
negative response were perceived as negative, and the friend
model and M*s positive response were perceived as positive.
Attitude Change: The Dependent Variables .
Attitude change toward X, Bob , oti th e posttcst . It may be
seen from Table 4 that the attitude formed tov«;ard Bob varied
with the situation. Subjects rated Bob most positively (6.49)
in the ER- situation, second most positively (5.14) in the FR+
situation, next most positively (5.76) in the ER+ situation,
and least positively (5.49) in the FR- situation. All of the
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ratings of Bob, ho^^/Gver, were on the positive side of neutral.
A one-way analysis of variance, performed on the ratings of Bob,
revealed that these ratings differed significantly across the
four situations (T = 3.92, df = 3/144, £ < .01). Duncan's
Multiple Range test v^7as performed to determine where the dif-
ference occurred. It was found that the very positive rating
of Bob (6.49) in the ER- situation was significantly (£ < .05)
more positive than the lower ratings of Bob in the FR- situation
(5.49) and in the ER+ situation (5.76). The rating in the ER-
situation, however, was not significantly more positive than the
rating of Bob in the FR-i- situation (6.14). The rating of Bob
in the FR+ situation (6.14) was significantly (jo < .05) more
positive than the rating in the FR- situation (5.49). None of
the other comparisons were significant. It is seen, then, that
Bob was rated positively when an enemy's behavior had a negative
consequence (5.49) rather than a positive consequence (5.76), or
when a friend's behavior had a positive consequence (6.14)
rather than a negative consequence (5.49).
Attitude change toward M, the teacher, on the posttest . As
was shown above, subjects appropriately perceived enemies as
negative and friends as positive. There were, in addition,
differences within the two enemy conditions and within the two
friend conditions. A one-way analysis of variance performed
on the posttest ratings of the model showed a significant dif-
ference across the four situations (F = 85.28, d_f = 3/144,
£ < .01). These findings parallel those found in the clerk
story. It can be seen from Table 4 that although an enemy was
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always rated below neutral, the rating of the enemy in the ER+
situation (3.65) was more positive than the rating of the enemy
in the ER- situation (2.27); and this difference v^;as significant
(E < .01) as shown by a Duncan »s Multiple Range test. Similarly,
it was found that a friend who behaved negatively was downrated
(7.00) as compared with a friend who behaved positively (8.24)
(£ < .01 on a Duncan's Multiple Range test). The model ratings,
-
in summary, showed that an enemy who acted positively was uprated
compared with an enemy who acted negatively, while a friend who
acted negatively was downrated compared with a friend who acted
posit ively
.
Posttest ratincrs of M^s attitude toward Bob . The means
reported in Table 4 show that a more positive attitude toward Bob
was attributed to a friend than was attributed to an enemy when
each performed the same type of response (7.11 vs. 6.16 and
U.84 vs. 3.30). The attitude toward X which was attributed to
M was found to differ significantly among the four situations
by a one-way analysis of variance (F = 45.75, df = 3/144, 2 < -01).
A Duncan's Multiple Range test was performed among the means.
The friend in the FR- situation was rated as having a more
positive attitude (4.84) toward Bob than was the enemy in the
ER- situation (3.30); this difference- was significant (2. < .01).
The friend in the FR+ situation, moreover, was rated as having
a more positive attitude (7.11) than the enemy in the ER+ situ-
ation (6.16); this difference was also significant (g. < .05).
A more positive attitude (6.16) was attributed to an enemy who
acted positively than to a friend who acted negatively (4.84):
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this difference was significant < .01). As would be expected,
a significantly < .01) more positive attitude (7.11) was
attributed to a friend who behaved positively than was attributed
both to a friend who behaved negatively (4.8i|) and to an enemy
who acted negatively (3.30). Further, an enemy who acted
positively was rated as having a significantly (p. < .01) more
positive attitude (6.16) than an enemy who acted negatively
(3.30).
In summary, a model who acted negatively was seen as having
a less positive attitude toward Bob than a model who acted
positively. Additionally, a friend was thought to have a more
positive attitude than an enemy when each performed the same
response.
Posttest ratincTs of the consequence of M's behavior. In
addition to the negative consequence being seen as negative and
the positive consequence being seen as positive as reported in
the Manipulation Checks section, there was also a difference
found in the perception of the severity of a consequence of a
friend^s behavior versus an enemy's behavior. A Duncan's Multiple
Range test showed that the negative consequence of an enemy's
behavior was seen as significantly (£ < .05) mere negative (1.97)
than the negative consequence of a friend's behavior (2.89).
There v;as not a sig-nificant difference in the rating of the
positive consequence of a friend's behavior versus an enemy's
behavior. In sum, an enemy's negative act was thought to be
vjorse than the same act performed by a friend.
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Posttest-Pretest Anr^ly^.j^
Change scores were obtained for each subject by taking the
difference between the posttest scores and the pretest scores
on the particular items of the story. Table 5 presents the
mean change scores from the pretest to the posttest for Bob
and the teacher in the four triadic situations of the teacher
story. The mean of all the pretest ratings for Bob was 5.24,
just slightly above neutral, the rating for the teacher friend
by those who received the friend story was 8.11, and the rating
for the teacher enemy by those who received the enemy story was
1.96. There were no significant differences between the ratings
of Bob and the lady in the clerk story, between the teacher friend
and the clerk friend, nor between the teacher enemy and the
clerk enemy.
• >
Posttest-Pretest Changes toward Bob .
A one-v/ay analysis of variance performed on the change scores
between the pretest and the posttest in attitude toward Rob
revealed a significant difference (F = 3.07, df = 3/144, £ < .05).
It was found by a Duncan's Multiple Range test that in the ER-
situation, the subjects' attitude toward Bob became significantly
(E. < -01) more positive from the pretest attitude (1.19) than
in the FR- situation (.16). There was also a significant
(£ < .05) increase in positive attitude toward Bob in the FR+
situation (1.00) as compared with the FR- situation (.16). No
other comparisons were found to be significant. Thus, there was
no significant difference found in the ratings of Bob whether a
friend acted negatively toward him (.16) as compared v\'ith an
Table 5
Mean Change Scores from the Pretest to the Posttest
for the Model and Bob in the Teacher Story
for the Four Triadic Situations
Situation
FR+ FR- ER+ ER-
Change Score tov;ard
X, Bob° l.OOa .16 .511 1.19
Change Score tov«7ard
M, the Teacher^ -19 -l.?2 1,73 .27
A positive change score indicates a more positive attitude
the posttest; a negative score indicates a more positive
attitude in the pretest.
^Mean of pretest ratings = 5.24.
Mean of pretest ratings for teacher friend = 8.11.
Mean of pretest ratings for teacher enemy = 1.95.
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enemy who acted positively tov^ard him (.54). Moreover, the
change in rating of Bob when an enemy acted positively tov.ard
him (.511) did not differ significantly from the change in
rating of Bob when a friend acted positively (1.00).
In summary, these change scores suggested that more positive
attitude change occurred toward Bob when the consequence of an
enemy »s behavior was negative than when the consequence of a
friend^s behavior was negative. It was also suggested that
there was more positive attitude change toward Bob when a friend
acted positively toward him than when a friend acted negatively
to^^7ard him.
£ost_test^Pretestj:^^^ .
A one-way analysis of variance performed on the change
scores between the pretest and the posttest on subjects' atti-tude
toward the model revealed a significant difference (F = 12.85,
df = 3/144, 2. < -01). Duncan's Multiple Range test revealed
that the increase in positive attitude toward the enemy in the
ER+ situation (1.73) was significantly (g^ <:^ .01) more positive
than the change score of the enemy in the ER- situation (.27).
The change in attitude from the pretest to the posttest, more-
over, V'jas significantly (2. < .01) less positive for a friend
who acted negatively (-1.22) than for. a friend who behaved
positively (.19). There was also a greater decrease (£ < .01)
in positive attitude tovv/ard a friend who behaved negatively
(-1.22) than tov;ard an enemy who behaved negatively (.27). As
can be seen in Table 5, the change in attitude toward an enemy
who behaved positively was positive (1.73) while the change in
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attitude toward a friend who behaved negatively was negative
(-1.22); the difference between these two means was significant
(R < .01). V]hen both a friend and an enemy performed a
positive act (FR+ and ER+)
, the attitude change tov.ard the
enemy (1.73) was significantly (£ < .01) more positive than
the attitude change toward the friend (.19). Finally, there
was no difference in attitude change between a friend whose
behavior had a positive consequence for Bob (.19) and an enemy
whose behavior had a negative consequence for Bob (.27), perhaps
because these were seen as appropriate behaviors for the
respective models.
In summary, the most meaningful finding was that a friend
who acted negatively was dovmrated (i.e., was rated less
positively) while an enemy who acted positively was uprated
(i.e., was rated less negatively).
Summary
In the teacher story, it was found that subjects rated Bob
most positively when the consequence of an enemy ^s behavior was
negative for him or when a friend^s behavior was positive for him.
In all situations, however. Bob was alv^;ays rated above neutral.
The subjects also rated the models in accordance with the kind
of behavior they performed. Thus, an enemy who behaved positively
was rated more positively than an enemy who behaved negatively.
A friend \^ho acted negatively was rated less positively than a
friend who acted positively. Finally, it was found that a model
who behaved negatively was rated as having a less positive
attitude toward Bob than a model who acted positively. Also
HO
a friend was thought to have a more positive attitude than an
enemy when each performed the same type of response.
_Storv 3: The Tiokp-h ^t-nt^^
The last story to be presented is the ticket story (see
Appendix C). Table 5 presents the mean scores from the bipolar
adjective pair (very positive/very negative) for M, for X, for
the consequence of M's behavior, and for the perceived attitude
of M toward X in the four triadic situations.
Posttest Analysis
" Manipu3._ation Checks of the Independent Variables.
A one-way analysis of variance was performed on the ratings
of the consequence of M's behavior for X, and a significant dif-
ference was found to exist among the ratings across the four
situations (T = 51.29, df = 3/144, £ < .01). It can be seen
.from the means in Table 6 that the consequence of M's behavior
in the two negative consequence conditions (R-) was judged to
be negative (2.87 and 3.08), while the consequence of M's
behavior in the two positive consequence conditions (R+) was
rated as positive (6.05 and 7.03). Duncan's Multiple Range test
performed on the individual means demonstrated that the larger
of the two negative consequence means (3.08) was rated as sig-
nificantly (£ < .01) less positive than the smaller of the two
positive consequence means (6.05). The other comparisons between
the positive and negative consequence means (6.05 vs. 2.87; 7.03
vs. 3.08; 7.03 vs. 2.37) which represent larger differences were,
of course, also found to be significantly different (£ < .01).
Table 6
Mean Posttest Ratings for the Model, Bill, the
;equencG of M»s Behavior, and the Perceived Attitude
of M to^^7ard X in the Ticket Story
for the Four Triadic Situations
FR+
Consequence of M's
Behavior tov;ard X, Bill 7. 03'
Attitude tovvard M 7.57
Attitude tovvard X 5.41
Perceived Attitude of
M tov\;ard X ^-"70
Situation
FR- ER+ ER-
3.08 6.05 2.87
6.05 3.m 1.89
6.08
,
^
5.41 6.51
4.03 5.38 3.32
Mean rating on 9-point scale:
1 is negative.
9 is positive, 5 is neutral.
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A second check on the experimental manipulations concerned
the rating of the model. A one-way analysis of variance was
performed on the ratings of M, and a significant difference
across the four situations was found (F = 59.66, df = 3/144,
E < .01). The subjects rated their enemies negatively, and
they rated their friends positively (1.89 and 3.14 vs. 6.05 and
7.57, respectively). Applying Duncan's Multiple Range test, the
more positive rating of the enemy (3.14) was found to be sig-
nificantly (£ < .01) less positive than the less pos itive rating
201l§^&iGDd (6.05). It follows, therefore, that the means for
the dncmy and friend conditions which were farther apart were
also significant (5.05 vs. 1.89; 7.57 vs. 3.14; 7.57 vs. 1.89).
In summary, then, subjects rated the enemy model and M's
negative response as negative, and they rated the friend model
and M's positive response as positive.
Attitude Change: The Dependent Variables .
Attitude change toward X, Bill, on the posttest . The means
reported in Table 6 show that the attitude formed toward Bill
varied with the situation. Subjects rated Bill most positively
(6.51) in the ER- situation, second most positively (6.08) in
the FR- situation, and least positively in the ER+ (5.41) and in
the FR+ (5.41) situations. All of the posttest ratings of Bill,
however, were greater than neutral. A one-way analysis of
variance performed on the ratings of Bill revealed that there
vias a significant difference across the four situations (F = 7.52,
df = 3/144, £ < .01). Duncan's Multiple Range test showed that
Bill was rated more positively (£ < .05) when the consequence of
U3
M»s act was negative for him than when the consequence was
positive (6.51 and 6.08 vs. 5.41). It was also found that there
was no significant difference between the rating of Bill in the
ER- situation (5.51) and in the FR- situation (6.08). Of course,
there also was no difference between the t^^o positive response
conditions since the means were identical (5.41).
In summary, it was found that the posttest attitude ratings,
of Bill were most positive in the ER- situation (6.51) and in
the FR- situation (6.08). These ratings were significantly
more positive than the rating in the ER+ (5.41) and in the FR+
(5.41) situation. Thus Bill v;as rated most positively when the
consequence of M's behavior was negative for him.
MtAtMg^change toward M, the college stiid^gnt^^_jnn_thp
£gsttest. As was reported above, subjects rated their enemies
negatively and their friends positively. There also were dif-
ferences within the two enemy conditions and within the two
friend conditions. A one-way analysis of variance performed on
the posttest ratings of the model showed a significant difference
across the four conditions (F = 59.56, df = 3/144, £ < .01).
It can be seen in Table 6 that although an enemy was rated con-
sistently below neutral, the rating of the enemy in the ER+
situation (3.14) was more positive than the rating of the enemy
in the ER- situation (1.89); and this difference was significant
(2. < .01) as revealed by a Duncan's Multiple Range test.
Similarly, it was found that a friend who acted negatively was
rated significantly (£ < .01) less positively (6.05) than a
friend v;ho acted positively (7.57).
The model ratings showed, in summary, that an enemy who
acted positively was uprated compared with an enemy who acted
negatively, while a friend who acted negatively was downrated
compared with a friend who acted positively.
Pgs£kgst_i^jjig^M^s attitude toward Bill . The means
reported in Table 6 show that, as in the other two stories, a
"
more positive attitude toward Bill was attributed to a friend
than was attributed to an enemy when each performed the same
type of response (5.70 vs. 5.38 and 4.03 vs. 3.32). The ascribed
attitude of M toward X was found to differ significantly among
the four conditions by a onc-v;ay analysis of variance (T = 21.53,
df = 3/lUL[, £ < .01). A Duncan's Multiple Range test v;as per-
formed among the means. The friend in the FR- situation was
rated as having a more positive attitude (H.OS) tov;ard Bill than
was the enemy in the ER- situation (3.32); this difference was
significant (£ < .05). The friend in the FR+ situation, moreover,
was rated as having a slightly more positive attitude (5.70)
than the enemy in the ER+ situation (5.38), but these two means
did not differ significantly. A more positive attitude (5.38)
was attributed to an enemy who acted positively than to a friend
who acted negatively (4.03); this difference was significant
(2. < .01). As V70uld be expected, a significantly (£ < .01) more
positive attitude (5.70) was attributed to a friend who behaved
positively than was attributed both to a friend who behaved
negatively (4.03) and to an enemy who acted negatively (3.32).
Further, an enemy who acted positively was rated as having a
significantly (2. < .01) more positive attitude (5.38) than an
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enemy v^7ho acted negatively (3.32).
In summary, a model whose behavior had a negative con-
sequence for Bill was seen as having a less positive attitude
tov,7ard him than a model whose behavior had a positive con-
sequence. In addition, a friend was seen as having a more
positive attitude than an enemy when each performed the same
response; this finding was only significant with respect to
the negative consequence conditions.
Posttest ratings of the consequence of M's behav ior. In
addition to the negative consequence being seen as negative and
the positive consequence being seen as positive as reported in
the Manipulation Checks section, there was also a difference in
the rating of the consequence- whether it resulted from a friend's
or an enemy ^s behavior. A Duncan's Multiple Range test showed
that the positive consequence of a friend's behavior was seen
as significantly (£ < .05) more positive (7.03) than the positive
consequence of an enemy's behavior (5.05). There v?as no sig-
nificant difference in the rating of the negative consequence
of a friend's or enemy's behavior. In sum, a friend's positive
act was thought to be more positive than an enemy's positive act.
Posttest-Pretest Analysis •
Change scores were obtained for each subject by taking the
difference between the posttest scores and the pretest scores
on the appropriate items for the story. Table 7 presents the
mean change scores from the pretest to the posttest for Bill and
the college student in the four triadic situations of the ticket
story. The mean of all the pretest ratings for Bill was 6.01.
Table 7
Mean Change Scores from the Pretest to the Posttest
for the Model and Bill in the Ticket Story
for the Four Triadic Situations
Situation
FR+ FR- ER+ ER-
Change Score toward 3
X, Billt^ -.68 .14 -.5U .43
Change Score toward M,
the College Student"^ "^-OO "2.70 1.3S -.16
positive change score indicates a more positive attitude
the posttest; a negative score indicates a more positive
attitude in the pretest.
^Mean of pretest ratings =6.01.
^Mean of pretest ratings for student friend = 8.66.
Mean of pretest ratings for student enemy = 1.92.
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A one-way analysis of variance vvas performed on the pretest-
ratings of Bill, Bob, and the lady, and a significant dif-
ference was found (F = 21.02, df = 2/441, £ < .01). A Duncan's
Multiple Range test revealed that the mean pretest rating of
Bill (6.01) was significantly (£ < .01) more positive than
the pretest rating of the lady (5.26) or of Bob (5.24). The
ratings of the lady and Bob did not differ significantly from
each other. The mean rating of the college student friend by
those subjects who received the friend story was 8.66. A one-
way analysis of variance was performed on the pre-ratings of the
friend on each of the stories and a significant difference was
found (F = 11.42, df = 2/219, £ < -01). A Duncan's Multiple
Range test showed that the pre-rating of the college friend
(8.66) v;as significantly (p < .01) more positive than the pre-
rating of the clerk friend (7.95) or of the teacher friend (8.11).
•The rating of the clerk friend and the teacher friend were not
significantly different from each other. The mean pre-rating
of the college student enemy by those subjects who received the
enemy story was 1.92. A one-way analysis of variance performed
on the enemies of the three stories found no significant dif-
ference among them (F < 1, df = 2/219, NS) .
Posttest-Pretest Changes tov^^ard Bill .
A one-way analysis of variance performed on the change
scores betv\;een the pretest and the posttest in attitude toward
Bill revealed a significant difference across the four situations
(F = 3.09, df = 3/144, £ < .05). It was found as is seen in
Table 7 that in the ER- situation, the subjects' attitude tov^;ard
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Bill became more positive from the pretest (.43). There was
more positive attitude ehange found in this situation than in
the ER+ situation (-.54) (^ < .05) or in the FR+ situation (-.68)
(E < .01). There was no difference in attitude change between
the ER- situation (.43) and the FR- situation (.14), nor were
any other comparisons significant. It may be noted that the
relatively large negative change scores in the FR+ (-.68) and
the ER+ (-.54) situations were due in large part to the sig-
nificantly high ratings of Bill in the pretest.
In summary, these change scores add support to the finding
that if the consequence of a model's, especially an enemy's,
behavior ivas negative for another, an observer rated that other
more positively than if the consequence of a model's behavior
was positive for him.
Posttest-Pretest Changes toward the Model .
A one-v;ay analysis of variance performed on the change
scores between the pretest and the posttest in subjects' at-
titude toward the model revealed a significant difference
(F = 21.79, df = 3/144, £ < .01). Duncan's Multiple Range test
showed that the increase in positive attitude toward the enemy
in the ER+ situation (1.35) was significantly (£ < .01) more
positive than the change score of the. enemy in the ER- situa-
tion (-.16). The change in attitude from the pretest to the
posttest, moreover, V7as significantly (£ < .01) more negative
for a friend who behaved negatively (-2.70) than for a friend
who behaved positively (-1.00). There was also a greater decrease
in positive attitude tovv/ard a friend v.'ho acted negatively
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(-2.70) than toward an enemy who acted negatively (-.15) (^ < .01)
As can be seen in Table 7, the change in attitude toward an
enemy who behaved positively was positive (1.35), v^hile the
change in attitude toward a friend v^;ho behaved negatively was
negative (-2.70); the difference between these two means was
significant (£ < .01). When both a friend and an enemy performed
a positive act and ER+)
, the attitude change toward the
enemy (1.35) was significantly (^ < .01) more positive than
the attitude change toi/ard the friend (-1.00). Finally, there
was no difference in attitude change between a friend whose
behavior had a positive consequence for Bill (-1.00) and an
enemy whose behavior had a negative consequence for Bill (-.16),
perhaps because these were seen as appropriate behaviors for
the respective models. It may also be noted that the relatively
large negative changes in the friend conditions vv'as probably due
.to the significantly more positive pretest rating of the friend
and thus, a ceiling effect. In summary, the most relevant
finding v;as that a friend who acted negatively was downrated,
while an enemy who acted positively was uprated.
Summary
In surmiary, in the ticket story it was found that subjects
rated Bill most positvely when the consequence of a model ^s
behavior was negative for him. In all situations, as in the
other two stories. Bill v\;as always rated above neutral. The
subjects also rated the models in accordance with the type of
behavior they performed. An enemy, therefore, who behaved
positively was rated more positively than an enemy who behaved
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negatively. A friend who acted negatively was rated less
positively than a friend who acted positively. Finally, it
was found that a model whose behavior had a negative consequence
for Bill was thought to have a less positive attitude toward
Bill than a model whose behavior had a positive consecjuence for
Bill. Additionally, a friend whose behavior had a negative
consequence for Bill v.as thought to have a more positive
attitude toward Bill than an enemy whose behavior had a
negative consequence for Bill.
£2I?^i'^i_FLindjUTgs
Although the posttest attitude scores and the change scores
of each of the stories were not exactly the same, many of the
findings were common to the three stories. First, in no case
was X, the other person, ever rated below' neutral. All ratings
of X were above 5.10. In every story, the rating of X in the
ER- situation was more positive than in any other situation.
With respect to the other three situations, the clerk story
and the ticket story patterned themselves the same. In each of
these stories, the rating of X (the lady and Bill, respectively)
in the FR- situation was second most positive; and the rating
of X in the ER+ and FR+ situations, the two positive consequence
conditions, were virtually the same and v;ere significantly less
positive than the rating of X in both negative consequence con-
ditj.ons (ER- and FR-) . The teacher story, however, did not
maintain the same pattern. The rating of X (Bob) in the ER-
situation was more positive than in any other situation, as was
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true in the other stories. The rating of Bob in the FR-^ situation,
however, was second most positive and not significantly dif-
ferent from the positive rating in the ER- situation. The
rating of Bob in the ER-f- situation was third most positive and
was not significantly different from the rating in the FR-f-
situation, the second highest rating. The least positive rating
of Bob occurred in the FR- situation. This rating was not
significantly different from the rating in the ER+ situation,
the third most positive rating, but it was significantly less
positive than the rating in the FR+ situation, the second most
positive rating.
As is seen, all the ratings of X were more positive than
neutral. It may be said, then, that a positivity effect occurred
when an observer rated another person with whom he was unacquainted
and who had received a positive or negative consequence of a
friend ^s or an enemy's behavior. It should be noted, moreover,
that some of the attitude change scores represent little attitude
change from the pretest, which points to the existence of a
positivity effect in the pretest, too. It seems that these
college students are loath to give negative ratings to others,
especially when their contact with these others is minimal.
A second finding which occurred consistently in all three
stories was the downrating of a friend v<7hose behavior had a
negative consequence for X and the uprating of an enemy whose
behavior had a positive consequence for X. In every story,
the rating of the enemy in the ER+ situation was significantly
more positive than the rating of the enemy in the ER- situation.
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Moreover, in every story, the rating of the friend in the FR-
situation was significantly less positive than the rating of
the friend in the situation. The posttest-pretest change
scores also supported this finding.
There were, in addition, fairly consistent findings con-
cerning the attitude toward X which was attributed to M. m
every story, the same sequence from most to least positive at-
titude toward X which was attributed to M was maintained among
the four situations. The friend in the FR+ situation was thought
to have the most positive attitude toward X, the enemy in the
ER+ situation v^as thought to have the second most positive
attitude, the friend in the FR- situation was seen as having
the second most negative attitude, and the enemy in the ER-
situation was seen as having the most negative attitude. All
of the comparisons within the three stories were significant
except for two: there was no difference in the attitude attributed
to a friend or to an enemy whose behavior had a positive con-
sequence for X in the clerk story and in the ticket story.
Finally, the rating of the severity of the consequence of
M^s behavior for X was found to follow a somewhat similar pat-
tern. In every story, the negative consequence of an enemy^s
act was rated more negatively than the negative consequence of
a friend's act; the difference, however, was significant only
in the teacher story. The ratings of the positive consequence
of M's behavior were a bit more variable. In the ticket story,
the positive consequence of a friend's behavior was rated sig-
nificantly more positively than the positive consequence of an
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enemy's behavior. In the other two stories, the clerk story
and the teacher story, there were no differences in the ratings
of a friend's or an enemy's positive behavior. In the clerk
story, in fact, the positive consequence of a friend's behavior
and an enemy's behavior were rated exactly the same. In the
teacher story, moreover, the consequence of a friend's positive
act was rated a bit less positively (although nonsignif icantly)
than the consequence of an enemy's positive act.
In general, it seemed that when the consequence of a
model's behavior, especially of an enemy's behavior, was
negative for a person, that person was rated positively.
Moreover, a model was rated according to the consequence of
the behavior he performed—within certain broad limits.
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DISCUSSION
Theoretical Analysis
Two theoretical conceptualizations have been presented
which provided different frameworks for the interpretation and
the prediction of attitude change in triadic situations. Table
1 presented a summary of the theoretical predictions concerning
the attitude 0 should be expected to develop toward X in each
of the situations. The attitude tov^;ard X predicted by modeling
theory ims the same as the consequence of a positive M^s
behavior and was the opposite of the consequence of a negative
M's behavior. The predictions based on balance theory specified
that a positive attitude tov^ard X would result in the FR+ and in
the ER- situations and that a negative attitude toward X would
result in the FR- and in the ER+ situations. If these attitudes
occurred, balanced systems would obtain.
The resu].ts now can be examined in light of these two
theories. As is seen below, neither theory, as originally
specified, accounted for the results. However, given the con-
straints subjects placed on the situations, balance theory was
sufficiently flexible to incorporate the results. It was the
important provision of a dynamic relationship between 0 and M
which allowed the results to fit into a balance theory framework.
Main Results: Attitude tov7ard X and M
Model inrj; Theory. The predictions that were made from
modeling theory (Bandura, 1965b, 1970; Bandura & Walters, 1963),
as summarized in Table 1, prescribe a negative attitude toward
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X in the FR- and ER+ situations, and a positive attitude in the
FR+ and in the ER- situations. It may be posited that the
observers reacted in kind to the friend's positive behavior
toward X in the FR+ situation and thus formed a slightly
positive attitude toward X. The observers, moreover, may have
reacted in opposition to the enemy's negative behavior toward
X in the ER- situation and changed their attitude toward X to
a positive one. This, however, does not account for the positive
attitude which occurred in the FR- and in the ER-i- situations.
In these two situations, negative attitudes were predicted on
the hypothesis that the observer would form an attitude toward
X v;hich was the same as the consequence of a friend's behavior
and the opposite of the consequence of an enemy's behavior.
These two predictions were not supported. The attitude toward
X i.n each of these situations was positive. It must be noted,
hov^ever, that the positive attitude in the ER-J- and in the FR+
situations represents a posttest attitude v;hich is above neutral,
but actually represents very little positive attitude change
from the pretest, especially for two of the stories.
Modeling theory offers no prediction concerning the decrease
in positive attitude which occurred toward the friend in the
FR- situation, nor the increase in positive attitude which
occurred toward the enemy in the ER-i- situation. Social learning
theory does not address itself to possible changes in attitude
tov;ard the model. Modeling theory assumes that the 0-to-M
relationship remains constant, and the focus is placed on M's
behavior. Predictions, then, concerning any change in the 0-to-M
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relationship are rarely, if ever, made. It seems, therefore,
that the results of the present study do not lend themselves
to a social learning interpretation.
Balance Thegrj^. The predictions that were based on balance
theory (Heider, 1958), as summarized in Table 1, prescribe a
positive attitude tov.ard X in the FR+ and the ER- situations
and a negative attitude toward X in the FR- and the ER+ situa-
tions. In the FR+ situation, a positive attitude tov^;ard X would
balance the situation. It was found that the attitude toward
X in each story was positive. The attitude toward X was not
always significantly more positive than the pretest rating, but
the ratings of X were consistently more positive than neutral,
thus producing a balanced situation.
In the ER- situation, a positive attitude toward X v^;as
predicted. In each of the stories, a positive attitude toward
X was obtained, and therefore, a balanced situation was achieved.
Thus, balance theory is able to account for the positive at-
titudes toward X which occurred in the FR+ and ER- situations.
In the FR- and the ER+ situations, where negative attitudes
toward X were predicted but were not obtained, it appears that
balanced systems did not occur. The finding of attitude change
toward the model, however, may be interpreted to indicate that
balance was actually achieved in all situations. It should be
remembered that the subjects showed great reluctance to rate any
X beloiv neutral, in the pretest as vv'cll as in the posttest.
Given this posit ivity effect toward X on the part of the subjects,
there is another way to achieve balance in situations which call
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for a negative rating of X, and that is with some attitude change
toward the model. In the FR- situation, for example, the sub-
jects know that M has acted negatively toward X, they know that
M is their friend, and they have some propensity to rate X
positively. The subjects can still balance their cognitions by
changing their rating of the model, and that is what they did.
They did not rate their friend negatively (i.e., below neutral),
but they did downrate him significantly. It is true that the
absolute rating of the friend was still above neutral, but it
seems to have been lowered sufficiently to balance the situation.
There are a number of interpretations which may account for
the decrease in rating of the friend who behaved negatively. One
possible explanation lies in the attribution process. Jones and
Davis (1965) claim that dispositional characteristics are inferred
from acts. It may be that in the present case a negative dis-
positional trait was inferred from the negative act and was
attributed to the friend; hence, the decrease in positive attitude
tov;ard the friend. A dispositional characteristic is assumed to
be a fairly enduring one, but empirical evidence is required to
determine the actual extent of its permanence.
A second possible interpretation of the decreased positive
attitude rating of the friend is that it is an expression of the
observer's immediate feeling of displeasure with the friend's
negative behavior and is thus only a temporary change. It may
be that when a person is faced with a situation in which his
friend behaves negatively toward someone he has an inclination
to rate positively, the person may want to reprimand his friend
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for the negative behavior. In the experimental situation, there
were no other avenues to express displeasure with the friend's
negative behavior except to rate him less positively, it may
be, then, that after the observer has expressed his displeasure,
the attitude will return to its former position. The temporary
quality of the attitude change would have to be experimentally
demonstrated. If it were, it is suggested here that it indicates
that the observer has "gotten over" the friend's negative behavior
and has restored the positive attitude.
,
There is no empirical evidence to indicate which of these
two explanations is more valid. It seems intuitively correct,
however, that the latter explanation represents many everyday
experiences. One negative act by a friend often angers a person
momentarily, but it is rarely sufficient to break up the friendship.
This same line of reasoning applies to the ER+ situation.
•A negative attitude toward X was predicted based on balance theory,
but it was not found. Instead, the subjects rated X positively,
in accord with the positivity effect, and they also rated the
enemy more favorably. The rating of X \ms not always signifi-
cantly more positive than the pretest rating, but it was con-
sistently above neutral and was positive enough for a balanced
situation to obtain. In this situation, then, an enemy's be-
havior had a positive consequence for someone whom the subjects
had an inclination to rate positively. In order for a balanced
system to obtain, the attitude tov;ard the enemy must change.
Subjects did viev; the enemy significantly more positively than
they did in the pretest rating. The rating of the enemy was still
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below neutral, but it see,.s to have been made suffieiently
positive to balance the system. If the 0-to-M relationship
were assigned a plus for the amount of increase in positive
attitude rather than for the absolute attitude, a balanced
system would result.
The two explanations outlined above of the decrease in
positive attitude toward the friend also seem to be applicable
to the increase in positive attitude rating of the enemy who
behaved positively. On the one hand, the observer may infer a
positive disposition from the enemy's positive act and he may
therefore become more accepting of the enemy. This, again, sug-
gests that the positive disposition represents a fairly enduring
characteristic of the enemy. Empirical support is needed to
determine the permanence of the more positive rating.
On the other hand, the increase in positive attitude toward
the enem.y may serve as an expression of the observer's immediate
feeling of pleasure with the enemy's positive behavior and may
be only a temporary change. It may be that when a person is
faced with a situation in which his enemy behaves positively
toward someone whom he has a propensity to rate positively, the
person may want to commend his enemy for the positive behavior.
Since there v^;as no other way in the experimental situation for
the observer to express his pleasure with the enemy, he could
only do so by rating him more positively. As was stated above,
is likely that the observer's attitude may return toward its
original position after he has expressed his immediate feelings.
Again, there is no evidence to suggest v\/hich of these two
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explanations is more appropriate. There does seem to be some
motivation on the part of the subjects in this study to rate
the story characters more positively than negatively. If this
positivity effect reflects a desire to see goodness in other
people, it may suggest that the increased positive rating of
the enemy would be more permanent than temporary. It seems
reasonable to believe that people may want to see good qualities
in others, and they may thus have a more lasting positive at-
titude change toward an enemy who has behaved positively. Em-
pirical investigation is needed to determine the permanence of
the attitude change toward both the enemy and the friend in this
type of situation.
In summary, it seem.s that neither theoretical interpretation,
as originally specified, was capable of explaining all of the
findings concerning attitudes tovv/ard X and M. No derivation
from either theory posited that the subjects would rate X above
neutral in every instance. No theoretical predictions were
made concerning any attitude change toward the model, although
attitude change toward the model was alluded to in the discussion
of balance theory. It was balance theory which was more capable
of accounting for the results of the present study.
The results do point to two shortcomings of balance theory
.
The first is the lack of specification of the degree of liking
or disliking. This is not the first time that this criticism
of balance theory has been made (Cart^^^^ight & Harary, 1956) . As
was found here, subjects seemed to balance the situations by
lowering the rating of a friend who behaved negatively and by
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raising the rating of an enemy who behaved positively. The data
of the present study show that a friend who behaved negatively
was rated positively, although that positive rating was
approximately one and a half scale points lower than the rating
of a friend who behaved positively. On a dichotomous scale such
as Heider's, both of these obtained ratings would be considered
positive. Similarly, the data obtained here indicated that an
enemy who behaved positively was rated negatively, although that
negative rating was approximately one and a half scale points
higher than the rating of an enemy who behaved negatively. On
a dichotomous scale, then, these obtained ratings would be con-
sidered negative. It was found in the present study that these
represented very different situations for people. By lowering
the rating of a friend who behaved negatively (yet still rating
him positively) and by raising the rating of an enemy who behaved
positively (yet still rating him negatively) balanced systems are
achievable. The subject has thereby achieved balance in terms
of the relative amount of attitude change toward M rather than
in terms of the absolute values of the attitudes.
A second criticism of balance theory which derived from
this study was its inability to predict which link in the triadic
situation would change most. It v>;as originally predicted that
the relationship betv^een the observer and the model would be
fairly tenacious and no attitude change would be manifested in
that relationship. It was also thought that the relationship
between the observer and an unknov\/n other person would be fluid
enough to show a great amount of attitude change. It was found.
62
The
however, that the results were almost exactly the opposite.
0-to-M relationship showed the most attitude change, and the
0-to-X relationship was consistently rated positively. One
theory which has been formulated which does specify precisely
which entity in a relationship will change, and the extent to
which it will change, is congruity theory (Osgood & Tannenbaum,
"
19S5)
.
Con,gTuitv Theory. It can be predicted, based on congruity
theory, that when two attitude objects of different evaluations
are connected by a positive assertion, there is some tendency
for the evaluations of the attitude objects to move tou'ard a
common point of congruity. If John Kennedy, for example, had
praised Communism, there would be some tendency for John Kennedy
to be evaluated less highly while Communism would be evaluated
more highly. If the two attitude objects are rated equally
positively or negatively, there is no movement tov^ard a common
point. The amount of attitude change that is predicted to occur
in the source and the concept is an inverse proportion of the
degree of polarization of each object of judgment. If Kennedy
were a very polarized positive source and he praised touch foot-
ball which is a fairly neutral concept, touch football should show
a proportionally greater change in evaluation than should Kennedy.
Two ad hoc corrections were added to their theory by Osgood
and Tannenbaum. These are the correction for incredulity and the
assertion constant. These corrections do not really follow from
the congruity principle, but they v;ere added in an attempt to
make some of the congruity implications more reasonable. The
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correction for incredulity allows for so.e disbelief of a
situation involving attitude objects differing widely in
evaluation. There is so.e disbelief, for example, that a very
positively rated source would praise a very negatively rated
concept, or that a very positively rated source would attack a
very positively rated concept, or that a very negatively rated
"
source would praise a very positively rated concept. The more
extremely rated the attitude objects, the more disbelief is said
to exist. The assertion constant relates to the fact that the
source of an assertion is less likely to be re-evaluated than
is the concept of an assertion. This constant is added to the
predicted attitude change for the concept of an assertion.
In the present experimental paradigm, a posirive or negative
model was positively or negatively linked (i.e., behaved with a
positive or a negative consequence) to an essentially neutral
other person. Congruity theory would predict that when a highly
polarized source is linked to a relatively neutral concept, the
less polarized concept will show the greater amount of attitude
change (as in the previous example, the attitude toward touch
football would change much, while the attitude toward Kennedy
would change little). In the present study, the results were
exactly opposite this congruity prediction. It was found that
attitude change consistently occurred toward a friend who behaved
negatively and toward an enemy who behaved positively. Attitude
change that occurred toward the other person (the neutral concept)
was, by comparison, relatively minor.
It is seen, then, that although the present study seems to
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suggest the operation of the congruity principle, the data fit
far from perfectly. The differences between the present study
and Osgood's work are thus highlighted. The first major dif-
ference is the type of link between the source and the concept.
In Osgood and Tannenbaum's theory, the link is either a positive
or a negative assertion. In most balance theory situations, more-
over, the link is "likes," "owns," "favors," or some other
relatively neutral term. In the present study, the link between
M and X was a behavior which had intrinsic positive or negative
value, for example, ignores a customer, passes a student. These
are behaviors which deliver either a positive or a negative con-
sequence to the receiver. One possible reason for the unpredicted
attitude change toward a model whose behavior was intrinsically
positive or negative is that more was learned about the doer of
the behavior than about the receiver. Knowing what kind of be-
havior an actor performs may reveal something about him. Very
little, however, is revealed about the receiver of an act. It
may be that this informational factor, v;hich derived from the
source having performed an innately positive or negative behavior,
was responsible for the marked changes in attitude toward the
source found in the present study. One important difference,
then, between the results of this study and the predictions of
congruity theory may lie in the nature of the posited bond between
the source and the concept (i.e., between M and X). It is sug-
gested here that when a source performs a behavior which has an
intrinsic positive or negative value, more information may be
convcyPid about the source than about the concept. It is further
suggested that the amount of information conveyed is directly
related to the amount of attitude change obtained.
Another difference between the variables manipulated in
this study and those discussed on Osgood and Tannenbaum's
theorizing is that the concept (X) in this study was really an
unknown person. Most of the work on congruity theory has dealt
with concepts about which subjects have some prior attitude,
e.g.. Communism and teaching machines. As was stated above,
the amount of attitude change predicted by congruity theory is
inversely proportional to the degree of polar ization cc the
object of judgment. In the present case, X was someone the
subjects did not know and someone about whom they probably did
not have strong feelings. Since X was a relatively neutral
object of judgment, a good deal of attitude change toward X
would be expected according to congruity principles.
The results of the present study did not conform to con-
gruity theory expectations. Relatively little attitude change
toward X was found. This may be because the subjects never
learned very much about X. Attitude change toward X did occur
in two cases only: first, when X received a negative consequenc
of M's behavior, particularly if M were an enemy; and second,
when X in the teacher story received the positive consequence
of M's behavior, particularly if M were a friend. It is not
immediately clear why this pattern of results occurred. The
idea that the subjects gained information about X may help
explain the results of the teacher story. In that story, there
is as much information conveyed about the student as about the
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teacher. The subjects probably assumed that Bob had worked for
his passing grade. In the situations in which X received the
negative consequence of a model's behavior, the infer mation
argument does not seem to hold up. Some other process must be
operating. There is no empirical evidence to indicate what is
happening. A reasonable speculation is that the subjects
empathized with the other person. This person was a victim of
negative behavior in situations in which the subjects may very
likely have found themselves. It is reasonable to assume that
the subjects were imagining themselves in these situations
and felt very sorry for anyone who received a negative act,
and they felt especially sorry if that negative act v^as per-
formed by an enemy.
Although the data of the present study did not fit exactly
into the framework of congruity theory, the examination of the
differences between the latter and the results of this study
does suggest one possible factor contributing to the results
obtained. As was stated above, the innately positive or negative
quality of M's behavior was probably the primary factor respon-
sible for the consistent change in subjects* evaluation of the
model in the FR- and ER+ situations.
Additional Comments
It was found that the teacher story differed from the other
two in the attitude ratings of X. The reason for this difference
is not immediately clear. One possibility concerns the nature
of X's behavior within each .story. In the clerk story and the
ticket story, X seemed to be merely a passive receiver of M's
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behavior; i.e., he could do vei^ little to influence the way in
which M would respond. In the teacher story, however, this was
not the case. It seemed more reasonable to assume that Bob was
the master of his fate. If he v^;orked hard, it was assumed he
would get a passing grade. If he did not do any work, he would
fail. It seemed as though Bob was in control of the grade he
received. For this reason. Bob was rated second most positively
in the FR+ situation, while the lady and Bill were rated least
positively in that situation. It was probably thought that the
friend behaved positively because Bob earned the grade. In the
other stories, X did not really earn the friend's positive be-
havior; X was merely present at the right time. In addition.
Bob was rated lowest in the PR- situation, while the lady and
Bill were rated second most positively. It was probably thought
that Bob did not work for his grade, and it was the friend's job
•to fail him. In the other stories, however, X VN/as not seen to
be deserving of the friend's negative behavior; X was not at
fault. It is felt that it was the locus of control of the con-
sequence of M's behavior which distinguished the teacher story
from the other two.
A word of caution concerning the change scores should be
raised. In the ticket story, both Bill and the college student
friend v\;ere rated significantly more positively than the characters
in the other two stories. It may be that these high ratings
were artifactual results of the pretest. Since these two item.s
"A college student named Bill who wants to go to a concert" and
"A college student who is your best friend" are ones with which
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college students can identify, they may have rated them higher
because they easily saw themselves as Bill or as the student.
In the posttest, however, with more information and structure
being added, the students no longer could identify with the
items as easily. Thus, Bill was rated much the same as the
lady and Bob were in the posttest, and the college friend was
rated much the same as the clerk friend and the teacher friend
in the posttest. This is one possible explanation for the
occurrence of the negative change scores in the ticket story.
A second note of caution concerning the change scores
relates to the lady and Bob being rated slightly higher in the
pretest than was anticipated. The posttest attitudes toward the
lady and Bob were consistently positive, but the pretest-posttest
change scores were often of little magnitude, or even negative.
It is felt that the fairly positive pre-ratings of the lady and
Bob did not accurately reflect the subjects' attitudes. There
is no empirical evidence to incriminate the pretest, but it is
felt that college students, given a long series of apparently
unrelated, unstructured items, may tend to avoid a neutral
response so as not to appear uninformed or uncaring. A method
of obtaining more accurate pre-ratings merits investigation.
jSupplementary Findings
Cons equence of M's behavior for X » It should be recalled
that differences in the consequences of a friend's or an enemy^s
behavior were found. The positive consequence of a friend's
behavior was found to be significantly more positive than the
positive consequence of an enemy's behavior in one of the
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stories. The negative consequence of a fricncPs behavior was
found to be consistently less negative than the negative con-
sequence of an enemy's behavior, although this was significant
also in only one of the stories.
These two findings, coupled with the attitude change toward
a friend who behaved negatively and tov^ard an enemy who behaved
positively, at first glance appear to suggest the operation of
the congruity principle (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955)
.
Applying congruity theory to this aspect of the present
Study, when an enemy is linked to a positive act, the enemy
should be evaluated less negatively and the act should be
evaluated less positively. It is further expected that v^hen
a friend is linked to a negative act, the friend should be
evaluated less positively and the act should be evaluated less
negatively. It must be remembered that the amount of attitude
change is inversely proportional to the degree of polarization
of the objects of judgment. In this instance, the degree of
polarization of the model and of the consequences are relatively
similar, with the model being slightly more polar. Congruity
theory would predict that with little incredulity present in
the situation, the attitude change tov;ard the consequences will
be greater than the attitude change toward the model. It was
found, however, ttet more attitude change occurred toward the
model. The attitude change which did occur was in the direction
of congruity principles, i.e., when a friend acted negatively,
he was evaluated less positively while the act was generally
rated less negatively, and when an enemy acted positively, he
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was evaluated less negatively while the act was rated less
positively at least in one^ instance. Thus, it seems that the
attitude objects moved to a point of equilibrium. In the
present study, moreover, no increduiJ.ty seemed to be operating.
It appears that the subjects believed the situations as they
were presented to them. If there were any disbelief, then it
"
is unlikely that the subjects' evaluation of the models would
have changed.
It is not immediately clear why the consequence effects
were sometimes significant and sometimes not. Neither effect
was significant in the clerk story. This may be due to the
fact that the consequence of being waited on first or second
is so mundane that it was apparently of little import whether
it resulted from a friend's or an enemy's behavior. The dif-
ference in the other two stories is not as obvious. IVhy there
is no difference in the negative consequences in the ticket story
or in the positive consequences in the teacher story is not clear.
Attitude of M toward X . In each story, when M's behavior
had a positive consequence for X, M was rated as having a more
positive attitude toward X than when M's behavior had a negative
consequence for X. Moreover, when M's behavior had a negative
consequence for X, the friend was alv/ays seen as having a sig-
nificantly more positive attitude than the enemy. When M's
behavior had a positive consequence for X, the friend v;as seen
as having a more positive attitude than the enemy, but this v;as
significant in only one story. Thus, it seems that people tend
to see their friends as having more positive attitudes tov;ard
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another than they see their enemies as having, especially when
the consequence of the models behavior is negative. This is
perhaps a result of the same positivity effect which produced
the fairly positive ratings of X in both the pretest and the
posttest. The subjects saw their friend, whose behavior had a
negative consequence, as having an attitude close to neutral in
two of the stories and only one point below neutral in the other
story. A possible interpretation of these findings is that
people attempt to attribute a friend's negative behavior to some
environmental cause rather than to any malice on the part of
their friend. They seem to do this while, at the same time,
downrating the friend for the negative behavior. People may
admit that their friend was v^;rong to permit a negative response
to happen, but they try to believe that it did not occur because
the friend was spiteful. They seem to reprimand the friend for
letting the behavior occur, but they do not dislike him totally
because of it. This may be one consistent cognition which people
can make use of while attempting to balance the situation.
A similar line of reasoning may be applied to the positive
consequence of M's behavior. A positive attitude was attributed
to both the friend and the enemy. The fact that there was a
significant difference in only one of the three stories suggests
that this may be one means of adding consonant elements to the
increased positive rating of the enemy in the ER+ situation. A
positive attitude tov;ard X was attributed to the enemy. It may
be that people attribute a positive behavior, not to an environ-
mental cousc, but to some benevolent feeling v/ithin the enemy.
People seem to believe that an enemy acted positively for the
same reason that a friend acted positively, or at least that
they both have similar feelings toward the recipient of the
behavior. Thus, v,7hen people see an enemy behave positively,
they tend to believe that he behaved as such through his own
positive attitude toward X, that is, through some intrinsic
goodness in him.
_Final Comments
The results of the present study suggest that triadic
situations represent complexly interwoven networks. It seems
that when people are confronted with' the knowledge that a friend
has acted negatively, a number of processes are set into action.
One process which occurs is the dov>mrating of the friend; this
process has been likened to a reprimand of the friend. Secondly,
the negative consequence produced by the friend's behavior tends
to be judged as less negative than if it had been produced by
an enemy's behavior. A third factor which occurs is that people
tend to vie\-i a friend as having a fairly neutral attitude toward
the person vv^ho must suffer the negative consequence of the
friend's behavior.
A similar line of thinking seems to be set into operation
when people learn that an enemy of theirs has acted to benefit
another person. One thing which occurs is that people rate the
enemy more favorably after he has acted positively. Secondly,
they see the enemy as having a fairly positive attitude toward
the person, almost as positive as a friend is seen as having.
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There is also a slight tendency for people to see the positive
consequence of an enemy's behavior as slightly less positive
than that of a friend's behavior. No chronological order is
hypothesized here; it is likely that the changes are part of
a Gestalt and take place simultaneously.
Such an elaborate network is not necessary v^7hen people are
"
confronted with a situation in which their friend has acted
positively or when their enemy has acted negatively. In these
situations, the attitude toward the friend or the enemy does
not change (although it is true that these change scores are
limited by a ceiling effect and a floor effect, respectively).
The model's attitude toward the other person seems to be
appropriately positive or negative, and the consequence of the
friend's or the enemy's behavior is also appropriately positive
or negative. It seems that people view these situations as con-
sistent with their existing cognitions; it is what they expect
from their friends and from their enemies. People do rate the
person who suffers the negative consequence of the enemy's be-
havior very positively--mor e positively than is really necessary
to balance the situation. Not only does this reflect the
operation of the congruity principle as it was modified here,
but also it reveals a sympathetic feeling within people which
tends to be activated by negative behavior--the rooting for the
underdog syndrome.
It is probably this syndrome, or lack of it, which accounts
for the less congruent ratings of the other person when he
receives the positive consequence of a friend's behavior. If
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congTuity were all that was operating, a very positive rating
of the friend would only be equalled by a very positive rating
of the other person. Since this did not occur, it would seem
to suggest that the congruity principle does not operate when
all the elements of the situation are positive. It must be
remembered that several distinctions were highlighted between
the present study and congruity theory, the most important of
them being the link between the source and the concept.
These many results do aid in focusing upon what occurs in
the cognitions of people faced with varied situations. First
of all, there seems to be a tendency to balance the situation.
This may be done, moreover, by lowering or raising a value
while maintaining the same valence sign. It is further sug-
gested that more attitude change will occur toward an entity
about which people have gained information. Tv\;o means of ob-
taining information were revealed in the present study. People
may gain information about an actor by the act he performs. In
addition, they may gain information about the receiver of an
act by determining the extent to which the receiver deserved
the consequence of the act.
The present study has provided some insights into the very
complex processes which people employ to cope with their world.
It has shown that two social psychological theories were unable
to predict all that will occur in people's behavior vv'hen they
are faced with four particular situations. Even in these situ-
ations, v;hich were rather sterile examples of everyday behavior,
a complexly interwoven netv\7ork of behaviors takes place. Balance
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theory, the more flexible theory of the two examined, seemed
to be modifiable to incorporate many of the results. The
criticisms of balance theory which have been raised by other
investigators (e.g., Cartwright & Harary. 1956)
-that the
degree of the relationship between any two entities should
be specified and that accurate predictions about which link
in the triadic situation will change most should be possible-
were brought to the forefront in the present study. It was
found that people tended to go beyond balanced systems and
brought the attitude objects toward a point of equilibrium,
especially with respect to their relationship with a friend
or an enemy. It is maintained, however, that of the two social
psychological theories investigated, balance theory is better
able to lend structure and meaning to complex behaviors.
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APPENDIX A
The Four Situations of the Clerk Story
(FR+)
Think of your very best friend, the person you like the
most. Write that person's initials in this space
.
Imagine that this person is v;orking as a clerk in a small
clothing store. There are two ladies in the store examining
the merchandise. One of the ladies has on a red coat and the
other has on a green coat. The lady in the green coat selects
a necktie and goes to the counter to pay for it. She waits
for the clerk. A few minutes later the lady in the red coat
also selects a necktie and also goes to the counter. Your
friend the clerk vv/aits on the lady in the green coat before
the lady in the red coat .
(FR-)
Think of your very best friend, the person you like the
most. Write that person's initials in this space
.
Imagine that this person is working as a clerk in a small
clothing store. There are two ladies in the store examining
the merchandise. One of the ladies has on a red coat and the
other has on a green coat. The lady in the green coat selects
a necktie and goes to the counter to pay for it. She waits
for the clerk. A few minutes later the lady in the red coat
also selects a necktie and also goes to the counter. Your
friend the clerk v\/aits on the lady in the red coat before the
lady in the green coat .
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(ER+)
Think of your very worst enemy, the person you dislike the
most. Write that person's initials in this space
__.
Imagine that this person is working as a clerk in a small
clothing store. There are two ladies in the store examining
the merchandise. One of the ladies has on a red coat and the
other has on a green coat. The lady in the green coat selects
a necktie and goes to the counter to pay for it. She waits for
the clerk. A few minutes later the lady in the red coat also
selects a necktie and also goes to the counter. Your enemy
the. clerk waits on the lady in the green coat before the lady
in the red coat.
(ER-)
Think of your very v/orst enemy, the person you dislike the
most. Write that person's initials in this space
.
Imagine that this person is working as a clerk in a small
clothing store. There are tvv'o ladies in the store examining
the merchandise. One of the ladies has on a red coat and the
other has on a green coat. The lady in the green coat selects
a necktie and goes to the counter to pay for it. She waits for
the clerk. A few minutes later the lady in the red coat also
selects a necktie and also goes to the counter- Your enemy
the clerk waits on the lady in the red coa t before the lady
in the green coat .
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APPENDIX B
The Four Situations of the Teacher Story
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(FR+)
Think of your very best friend, the person you like most.
Write that person's initials in this space
_.
Imagine that this person is an English teacher in a high school.
Imagine that in your friend's class is a boy named Boh. This
is Bob's junior year in high school. He has had only a marginal
record since his first year. He is taking your friend's English
course and is on the border of failing. If he does not pass
the course, he will have to take the course the next year,
making his senior year a difficult one. Your friend is aware
of Bob's plight. Final exam period has arrived and Bob's
English exam is scheduled. After Bob takes the exam, your
friend the teacher corrects it first. He/She gives Bob a
passing grade and Bob will not have to take the course again.
(FR-)
Think of your very best friend, the person you like most.
Write that person's initials in this space
Imagine that this person is an English teacher in a high
school. Imagine that in your friend's class is a boy named
Bob. This is Bob's junior year in high school. He has had
only a marginal record since his first year. He is taking
your friend's English course and is on the border of failing.
If he does not pass the course, he will have to take the
course the next year, making his senior year a difficult one.
Your friend is aware of Bob's plight. Final exam period has
arrived and Bob's English exam is scheduled. After Bob takes
the exam, your friend the teacher corrects it first. He/She
gives Bob a failing grade and Bob will have to take the course
again.
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(ER+)
Think of your very worst enemy, the person you dislike
the most. Write that persons' initials in this space
Imagine that this person is an English teacher in a high
school. Imagine that in your enemy's class is a boy named
Bob. This is Bob's junior year in high school. He has had
only a marginal record since his first yenr. He is taking
your enemy's English course and is on the border of failing.
If he does not pass the course, he will have to take the
course the next year, making his senior year a difficult one.
Your enemy is aware of Bob's plight. Final exam period has
arrived and Bob's English exam is scheduled. After Bob takes
the exam, your enemy the teacher corrects it first. He/She
gives Bob a passing grade, and Bob will not have to take the
course again.
(ER-)
Think of your very worst enemy, the person you dislike
most. Write that person's initials in this space
.
Imagine that this person is an English teacher in a high
school. Imagine that in your enemy's class is a boy named
Bob. This is Bob's junior year in high school. He has
had only a marginal record since his first year. He is taking
your enemy's English course and is on the border of failing.
If he does not pass the course, he will have to take the
course the next year, making his senior year a difficult one.
Your enemy is aware of Bob's plight. Final exam period has
arrived and Bob's English exam is scheduled. After Bob takes
the exam, your enemy the teacher corrects it first. He/She
gives Bob a failing grade, and Bob will have to take the
course again.
APPENDIX C
Four Situations of the Ticket Story
(FR+)
Think of your very best friend, the person you like the
most. Write that person's initials in this space
,
Imagine that this person attends college and had purchased a
ticket to an upcoming concert on Saturday night. Your friend,
however, has just changed plans and won't be using the ticket.
There is another student. Bill, at the same college. He v^;ants
to attend the concert, but the tickets v^ere just sold out
before he ^ms able to purchase one. Bill has $2.00 available
to spend on the ticket, although he does not know the admission
price. Your friend the student offers the ticket to Bill for
$2.00 and no lower. Thus Bill is able to go to the concert.
(FR-)
Think of your very best friend, the person you like the
most. VJrite that person's initials in this space
.
Imagine that this person attends college and had purchased a
ticket to an upcoming concert on Saturday night. Your friend
has just changed plans and won't be using the ticket. There
is another student. Bill, at the same college. He wants to
attend the concert, but the tickets were just sold out before
he was able to purchase one. Bill has $2.00 available to
spend on the ticket, although he does not knov^; the admission
price. Your friend the student offers the ticket to Bill for
$4.00 and no lower. Thus Bill is unable to go to the concert.
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(ER-1-)
Think of your very worst enemy, the person you dislike most.
Write that person's initials in this space
. imagine
that this person attends college and had purchased a ticket to
an upcoming concert on Saturday night. Your enemy, however,
has just changed plans and won't be using the ticket. There
is another student. Bill, at the same college. He wants to
attend the concert, but the tickets were iust sold out before
he v;as able to purchase one. Bill has $2.00 available to spend
on the ticket, although he does not know the admission price.
Your enemy the student offers the ticket to Bill for $2,00 and
no lower. Thus Bill is able to go to the concert.
(ER-)
Think of your very worst enemy, the person you dislike the
most. Write that person's initials in this, space
.
Imagine that this person attends college and had purchased a
ticket to an upcoming concert on Saturday night. Your enemy,
however, has just changed plans and won't be using the ticket.
There is another student. Bill, at the same college. He wants
to attend the concert, but the tickets were just sold out before
he v\;as able to purchase one. Bill has $2.00 available to spend
on the ticket, although he does not knov; the admission price.
Your enemy the student offers the tickets to Bill for $14.00 and
no lower. Thus Bill is unable to go to the concert.
APPENDIX D
Samples of the Posttest Altitude Questionnaire
(Questionnaire follov^ing the ER+ and ER- situations
of the Teacher Story)
Hov; do you feel toward Bob?
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
How do you feel toward your enemy the English teacher?
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
What. do you think the consequence of the English teacher's
behavior was for Bob?
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
V/hat do you think the English teacher's attitude is toward Bob?
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
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(Questionnaire following the FR+ and FR- situations
of the Ticket Story)
How do you feel toward Bill?
Very Neutral " ' Very
Positive Negative
How do you feel toward your friend the college student?
Very Neutral ' ' Very
Positive Negative
What do you think the consequence of the student's behavior
was for Bill?
Very Neutral Very
Positive Necrative
V/hat do you think the student's attitude is toward Bill?
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
APPENDIX E
The Pretest
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Your very best friend.
Very Neutral
Positive Negative
A high school student named John who is taking a history
course.
Very Neutral " Very
Positive Negative
A lady in a brown coat who is deriving a car.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
A college student named Diane who is typing a paper.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
A high school English teacher who is your very best friend.
Very Neutral Very
Positive . Negative
A store clerk who is your very worst enemy.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
A postman who is delivering mail in a small town.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
A high school student named Bob who has a marginal record and
is taking an English coarse.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
Your very worst enemy v^;ho is a col3 i-ident
.
Very Neutral
Positive Very
Negative
A college student named Jack who w:., ) go to a footballgame .
Very Neutral
Positive VeryNegative
A high school student who is playii- leyball,
Very Neutral
Positive
A librarian who is your very worst
Very
Negative
Very Neutral
)sit ive
A lady in a green coat who is shop}
. .
Very
Pos Negative
Very Neutral Very
Positive
. Negative
Your very best friend who is a coi: - . rudent.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
A college student named Bill who w- o go to a concert.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
A man in a blue jacket who is takir Ik.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
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17. A high school English teacher who i?
..r very worst enemy,
Very Neutral
Positive Very
Negative
18. A high school student named Jane whc going to a play.
Very Neutral
Positive Very
19. A store clerk who is your very best end
Negative
Very Neutral
Positive
20. A lady in a red coat who is shoppincr
Very
Negative
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
21. A college student who is going to a :ioIogy class,
Very Neutral ~ Very
Positive Negative
22. A book salesman who is selling book; colleges.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
23. A librarian who is your very best f: d.
Very Neutral Very
Positive
; Negative
24. Your very worst enemy.
Very Neutral Very
Positive Negative
25.
.
A lady in a gray coat -who is going ' ;e post office,
Very Neutral Very
Positive Kepative

